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periodic reviews of the need for surrogate management seem warranted.
Certainly, the standard for restoration of rights ought to be no more rigorous
or more diflicult than those for initial appointment of a surrogate.
Additionally, a provision allowing the prospective designation of a
conservator or guardian by a person anticipating later surrogate management
of his property seems to preserve at least a medium of his individual autonomy
and seems desirable.
Irres pecti ve of how h e was designated, the prospect of a surrogate
manager's conflict of interests with his ward should be recognized by the
appointment of a guardian ad litem for the ward when major decisions
affecting the finances of both the conservator/guardian and ward must be
made. It is probably not practicable to provide for such appointment in all
ca�cs but the appointing court should be charged with identifying transactions
requiring it and there should be at least a periodic appointment to represent
the ward when the surrogate manager accounts to the court. Of course, the
nced for an additional appointment would be eliminated entirely if the
conservator/guardian had no direct financial interest in the estate.

THE AGED PERSON'S RIGHT TO PROPERTY
George J. Alexander**
The evolution of treatment of t h e aged by the s t ate insofar as the
management of their property is concerned is extremely instructive. One thing
that quickly becomes evident in the review of historical development is that;
the state has not bascially altered its intervention in the right of self-manage
ment of the aged but it has very basically changed its description of the process.
Briel1y to review what was stated at greater length in the earlier presen
tation, the aged who were subjected to such practice were historically de
prived of management rights in their property under the provision of law
applicable to lunatics. In some states that is still the law. In many, the lunacy
provisions remain the appropriate legislation, but persons may be declared
incompetent on the basis of lunacy (perhaps now mental illness) or age.
Finally, many states have moved toward a separate incompetency proceeding
exclusively for the aged. In such proceedings, the determinative issue is still
whether the subject of the proceeding is competent to function adequately in
the disposition of his property but the statutes carefully avoid any link with
this kind of competence and insanity. Even the surrogate managers of
property lose their titles as guardians and become instead conservators.
**
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Inherent in this semantic juggling is the recognition of the often
devastating impact of la belling persons insane. Quite aside from the
stigmatizing effect of such a label and its consequent dehumanizing of the
person labelled, the characterization tends to carry with it certain inevitable
consequences wholly unrelated to the goals of surrogate management of the
property of the aged, the most horrendous of which is institutionalization.
These are matters on which I have previously commented176 and on which the
literature is extensive.177 It should suffice to note with relief the movement
away from the use of the concept of mental illness in providing surrogate
managers for the aged.
One should also note that the insanity test when it was in vogue appeared
to impose no significant legal barriers to the process. Although the test was
mental incompetence in the insanity sense, the testimony in the cases appears
to have been largely the same testimony that is now admitted on the issue of
functional competence. Primarily, the question still is how bizarre was the
behavior of the person in question? Whether described in medical jargon or
in lay language, judgment about behavior was and is the central test. One
should not be surprised. Precisely the same thing happens in criminal law. The
insanity of a defendant i s relevant to his responsibility. His functional
competence to assist in his defense is relevant to his triability. If one compares
the testimony introduced on responsibility with the testimony introduced on
competence to stand trial, he will find the same similarity that is to be found
in testimony concerning the need for conservator and that relating to a
guardian. The reason, of course, is that whatever utility medical concepts may
have in the treatment of patients, as used in the legal context, mental illness
is merely a conclusion design�d to support a result. If one wishes to exculpate
a criminal defendant he is mentally ill. If one wishes to convict him, he is sane.
Similarly, if one wishes to deprive an aged person of the right to manage his
property, he is mentally ill (if that is the test), otherwise, he is sane.
Unfortunately, mental illness because it is described in medical terms is
176. Alexander and Szasz, Mental lllness as an Excuse for CMl Wrongs. 43 NOTRE DAME
24 (1967).
177. T. SZASZ, LAW, LIBERTY AND PsYCHIATRY (1963); T. SZASZ. PsYCHIATRIC JUSTICE
(1965); Morris, Habeas Corpus and the Confinement of the Mentally Disordered in New YorL
the Right to the Writ. 6 HARV. J. LEGIS. 27 (1968). Harris, Mental lllness. Due Process and
Lawyers. 55 A.B.A.J. 65 (1969). Allen, Retarded Offender: Unrecognized in Court and Untreated
in Prison. 32 FED. PROB. 22 (1968). Tao, Civil Commitment of the Mentally II in the District
of Columbia. 13 How. L.J. 303 (1967). Civil Restraint. Mental Illness. and the Right to
Treatment. 77 YALE L.J. 87 (1967). Swartz, Compulsory Legal Measures and th,' Concept of
L. REV.

lllness. 19 S.c .L . REV. 372 (1967). InvoluntaT\' Commitment o( the Mentalll" II in Pennsril'ania.
5 DUQUESNE U.L. REV. 487 (1967). Massachusetts Commitment and Hospitalization Laws (or
the Mentally lll: Analysis and Proposals for Change. 2 PORTIA L.J. 19 (1966). Plaut 8< Holland.
Recognition and Handling of Emotional Problems and Mental lllness by the Attorney. \3 PRAC.
LAW. 69 (1967). Release Procedure under the Pennsylvania Mental Health and Mental
Retardation Act of 1966.5 DUQUESNE U.L. REV. 496 (1967).
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often not recognized as a means to an end and is erroneously perceived in its
legal context to be subject to scientific verification. Consequently, triers of fact
tend to be somewhat mesmerized by the testimony of experts with medical
training. 17K In the worst cases, they may decide incorrectly as to whether a
surrogate manager is appropriate because they weigh the medical reliability
of those before them. In the best cases they are subjected to a significant
amount of irrelevant information in an effort to decide a fairly straight
forward question. One should, consequently, applaud the movement of the law
toward a more precise inquiry into the ability of a person to function and
away from broader notions relating to the state of his supposed mental health.
The next important inquiry should follow fairly naturally from the
resolution above described. Implicit in the notion that the standard for state
intervention for purposes of surrogate management should have a precision
not reached by the broad mental illness standard is a recognition that this kind
of intervention is a bask: deprivation of a right cherished in a free society: the
right of an individual to self determination. It is important to recognize that
however benevolent the intention of those who would seek to substitute other
decision makers for the aged, persons deprived of the right to decide for
themsel ves will ha ve lost the fairly basic attri bute of ci tizens hip.179
Consequently, it seems more appropriate to view the question of how the law
should intervene not as a question of maximizing benefit to the potential ward
but of reducing to a minimum the deprivation of that person's rights. From
this perspective, one might better ask in whose interest is a surrogate manager
of property appointed?
There is one sense in which the notion that the surrogate is imposed on
an individual solely in his own interests is probably sound. It is doubtless true
that courts could find property managers for most people who, because of
su perior experience and skill, would better manage the property than their
wards. This is merely a specific application of the fact that there are usually
people of greater skill and capacity than any given person. Without even
considering whether the legal process is perfect enough to substitute a better
decision maker in most cases, about which we could have some doubt, it is
easy to reject the notion of benefit to a person occasioned by providing such
paternalistic oversight. A person may, of course, always voluntarily obtain a
skilled manager for his property; if one is involuntarily imposed on him one
should be skeptical of the benefit of such appointment to the potential ward.
Especially in the case of the aged, one can reject the facile answer often
given in other cases that a surrogate can preserve property which his ward will
later be able to use. To the extent that conditions of the aged are likely to be
the result of general deterioration of mental processes, it seems unlikely that
178. Dershowitz, Psychiatry in the Legal Process: a Knife that Cuts Both Ways, 4 TRIAL
29 (Feb.-Mar. 1968).
179. Alexander and Szasz, supra note 176, at 28.
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the property management function will often revert to the ward. Although his
wealth may increase, unless he retains the power to spend his money to
maximize his own enjoyment, the ward's affluence would hardly seem likely
to be perceived by him as a benefit. It is, of course, possible that a condition
requiring substitute management is temporary and that the ward will be able
to benefit from an intervention which prevents the dissipation of property
which later he could enjoy. At this point, the information available to the
study group does not indicate what proportion of those enmeshed in surrogate
management have a reasonable expectation of again becoming autonomous.
The question should, obviously, be explored.
Without empirical data, we can only note that the process described deals
with people who by definition are mentally debilitated; no reason exists to
assume that such people as a class are any more indif ferent to proper
maintenance of their wealth than the general population. Presumably, those
who need surrogate managers will in many cases voluntarily obtain them.
Also, the coupling of management operations and decision-making in the
hands of the surrogate manager may be an unnecessarily broad interference
with the rights of the ward. As many of the aged suffer merely from memory
loss and unfamiliarity with legal processes without having lost their judgment
concerning their personal goals. whatever "judgment" might mean in this
context, a provision allowing a surrogate to seize decision-making authority
appears to be an overreaction to the problem. As an alternative, to guardians
or conservators, the law should permit courts to appoint a new category of
agents called, perhaps, legal assistants.
A legal assistant would be responsible for reviewing with his charge all
major financial transactions which the charge seeks to undertake. He would
remind him of prior obligations, legal restrictions and other complications to
be anticipated but would be expressly denied the right to substitute his own
decision for that of his charge. In effect, he would provide a service that is
directly responsive to a weak memory and a lack of orientation to the legal
framework of commerce without removing the essential right to property
disposition from the aged person.
While the mechanics for t his proposed relationship are beyond the
purpose of this brief comment the following notions may flesh out the essential
idea sufficiently for further study. The law might provide for the void ability
of all major contractual and property transactions made after the designation
of a legal ass· i stant unless the agreements were made with both the legal
assistant and his charge or co untersigned by the legal assistant. Minor
transactions, such as purchases of necessities, should probably be exempted so
as not to complicate unnecessarily the every day functioning of the charge.
The legal assistant should be obliged fully to explain the implications of a
proposed transaction to his charge but, equally explicitly, be required to
authorize any transaction pro posed when his c harge has arrived at an
informed judgment as to its merits.

By such an agency the state could

satisfy itself that debilitated persons would not fall victim to sharp practices by
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others without depriving the person of the reason for the protection: the
preservation of his legitimate use of his own wealth.
The availability of these two alternatives to surrogate management,
neither of which requires depriving a person of the ability to make use of his
own property, would seem in most cases adequate to deal with the problem

from the standpoint of the interests solely of the ward. Obviously, however,

the ward is not the only person concerned in the maintenance of his wealth.
Those who are potential beneficiaries of the ward's affluence take a natural
interest in its waste; the state has an interest in preventing its citizens from
so reducing their financial integrity as to become public charges. What is
important about these interests is that they are interests adverse to the interests
of the ward. The present process, with its focus on benefit to the ward,
inadequately and inarticulately deal with such interests. In consequence,
beneficiaries find themst:-!ves in the cynical position of being forced to plead
in court for surrogate management premised on benefit to the object of the
proceeding rather than, ,::andidly, benefit to themselves. I shall review shortly
a number of illustrations of such suits. Unfortunately, when the underlying
self interest of the petitioner is probed he appears in a very bad light in such
court proceedings. Equally unfortunately, when this issue is not explored,
potential beneficiaries may be awarded an interest in the ward's property
which the court would find untenable were it determined from the perspective
of protecting the beneficiaries' interest rather than the ward's.
A better procedure, it would appear to me, would be to attempt
legislatively to identify legitimate interests of others and to protect them
expressly in law r a ther than to p rotect them circuitously through
incompetency proceedings. The same apparently bizarre spending habits of a
potential ward would seem much more objectionable where they divert funds
from a destitute wife than when' they represent merely the extravagence of a
person who has decided in old age to become self-indulgent at the expense only
of distant relatives who might otherwise stand to inherit on his demise.
The law has already established fairly viable procedures for the protection
of its OWl! interest in pre-venting citizens from becoming wards of the state.I�O
It has also addressed itself quite concretely to the requirement of support of
a wife or an ex-wifew and, at least in minority, of a child, legitimate or not.182
Parents, also, may be entitled to a modicum of financial support at least when
without such support their indigence threatens public coffers.l83 Creditors have
180. See, e.g.. N.Y. 00\1. REL. LAW § 32(4,5) (McKinney (964); N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT
� 415 (McKinney Supp. (968).
181. SI'I!. e.g., N.Y. DO�I. REL. LAW § 32(1) (McKinney (964); N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 412
(McKinney (963).
182. SI!I!. I!.g.. N.Y. 00\1. REL. LAW §§ 30-43 (Uniform Support of Dependents Law)
(McKinney (964); N.Y. FA�I. CT. ACT § 413 (McKinney Supp. (969).
183. See. .. g N.V. FA�1. CT. ACT § 415 (McKinney Supp. (969).
.

.•
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a right to collect their debts.l� It would seem useful now to attempt to identify
others whose financial expectations should also be expressly recognized by
law. Admittedly, I have not attempted to delimit the group. Perhaps it is
already large enough. The question appears t o be worthy of further
consideration.
Once society has appropriately identified those who may legitimately
expect financial support from a given person, it would seem a salutary change
in the focus of present law to a llow a direct action by such persons in

pursuance of their interests in preference to an incompetency proceeding

addressed against the ward. Of what moment is the mental acuity of a wealthy
defendant if he in fact squanders funds which society has decided should first
meet his obligations to those near to him? Indeed, a squandering of money
legitimately owed to creditors or spouses or others would seem morally far
more reprehensible when the squanderer is a person fully capable of more
circumspect management. On the other hand, the self-indulgence of a person
on whom no one legitimately depends, however abhorrent to our Calvinist
tradition, ought not to occasion state intervention.
Recasting the problem of surrogate management in adversary terms leads
to one other important result. The self-interest of the surrogate manager
becomes a problem of moment. At present, the law prefers near relatives to
strangers as surrogate managers. Yet near relatives are most likely to have
their own financial expectations in their ward's estate and thus to be driven
by duty to their ward and self-interest in opposite directions. Any authorized
expenditure reduces their own potential inheritance.
While courts can supervise surr ogate relationships with a view to
preventing decisions adverse to the ward's interests, the time expenditure
required makes it unlikely that they will adequately accomplish such a
demanding task. It would seem better to eliminate the conflict of interests. Yet
near relatives are often the only available surrogates and sometimes (but not
always) the most sympathetic ones.
One solution to the problem would be to require courts to attempt to
obtain professional managers as surrogates in all cases. In the event the estate
is sizable, the task should not be difficult. (In the event that the estate is too
small to attract professional management, the temptation to near relatives is
likely also less pronounced.) If it is determined that professional management
is available, a court should give near relatives the option of professional
management or their own appointment, conditioning the appointment of the
surrogate on an express renunciation of any financial benefit from the ward,
in his life or on his death, other than the fee for guardianship/conservatorship.
If professional management is unavailable, no such renunciation should be
required. Of course, the ward's previously expressed wishes, if legally compe184. See. e.g . N.Y. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-106 (McKinney 1964).
.
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tent, ought to prevail over the plan described. The plan is designed to meet
what will likely remain the great majority of cases in which the ward has not
previously expressed himself on the subject.
While the discussion so far has related specifically to problems of the
aged it seems appropriate to note that the notions above expressed are
applicable not only to aged citizens but equally to all citizens threatened by
state intervention in their property management. Others accused of the
"mental illness" which was once the hallmark of proceedings against the aged
would seem equally entitled to remain in possession of their rights of property
disposition so long as they do not deprive others legitimately entitled in the
pr ocess. It again seems to make little difference whe ther the a lleged
squandering of funds results from indulgence in old age or the desire more
fully to live in one's fantasy life. It will, of course, be asserted that it is more
likely in cases of mental illness than of mere aging that t he period of
incompetence is a temporary one and that the property could be preserved for
later use by the incompetent. I am not prepared adequately to refute the
accuracy of such an observation; an empirical study would seem warranted.
The length of present terms of incarceration of persons committed for mental
illness suggests, however, that the notion of "speedy cure" of "mental
illness," whatever that might mean, is a distant one. Also, the implicit
assumption that there is a legally relevant content to the notion of mental
illness is again called into question though I will not belabor that point here.
Instead, I should like to illustrate prior use of "mental il lness" as a
determinant of incompetence to manage property to demonstrate the
significance of recasting the problem in adversary terms and abandoning the
euphemistic notion of benefit to the ward.
Some of the curious conflict of interest of the type discussed can be found
in Denner v. Beyer.l'6S The alleged incompetent's sister brought the proceedings
to have hers elf appointed guardian and succeeded in obtaining that
appointment in a trial court. In the ward's appeal to the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania, it turned out that her interests were substantially adverse to
those of her guardian. The ward was a diabetic and partially blind widow of
sixty years. She had inherited approximately twenty-two thousand dollars
from her husband and had given plaintiff a power of attorney over her money
in return for a promise to provide a home for her for life. According to the
ward, shortly thereafter, her guardian renigged on the obligations of care and
attempted to place her in homes in various parts of Pennsylvania. The ward's
response was to revoke her will, removing her guardian as chief beneficiary
and revoking the power of attorney. At this point, the guardian countered by
bringing an incompetency proceeding. By the success in the trial court, the
guardian obtained not only a continuation of her power of attorney, now
185. 352 Pa. 386,42 A.2d 747 (1945).
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judicially sanctioned, but also well advanced her litigation posture on probate
of the will, being able to claim that the revocation was a product of a diseased
mind. If anything, the appellate court appears to be guilty of understatement
when it notes:186 "The record gives the impression that the motive for the
petition was not so much to conserve the respondent's property as to channel
its inheritance to the next of kin. "181
Similarly, in Lomax v. Washam,I�8 a daughter obtained guardianship
when her father, after an unsuccessful period of living with her, used his
resources to finance a home for himself with strangers. Especially as those
strangers began to become beneficiaries of his limited estate, his daughter
sought judicial intervention and, as in the prior case, found the trial court
quite w illing. The appellate court reversed, blocking her plans. Also, in
Malnick's Estate,189 the Supreme Court of Nebraska was forced to reverse an

appointment of a guardian which appeared to have been premised primarily
on the ward's inability to account for the disposition of a sum of $5,400 which
she had received in a one year period. The court noted that the daughter who
would obtain guardianship was a joint tenant in the ward's property, bonds,
checking accounts, and safe deposit box and thought her an inappropriate
guardian.
The fact that, in each case, the guardianship was dissolved on final appeal
should not be understood as an indi cation that such cases are resolved
satisfactorily in the present system. Research of the cases of necessity focused
on data available in reported decisions. Only in those in which an appellate
court was perceptive enough to look through the discussion on mental illness
or functional incompetence (and thus often reversed the decision below), could
one obtain a sense of the facts. Doubtless, the appellate cases mentioned are
illustrative of many others in which the trial court prevailed. Even were one
more sanguine about court decision on appellate review, the substantial costs
of appeal in addition to trial would make this an inappropriate method of
safeguarding wards.
The problem can, of course, be more complicated than a simple effort
by beneficiaries to insure their inheritance. The proceeding may turn out to

by an effort by some of the beneficiaries to improve their position vis-a-vis

other beneficiaries. Thus, in Lamont's Estate,19D the trial and appellate courts
both agreed that lapses in memory on the part of the ward would justify the
appointment of a guardianship. Mrs. Lamont had obvious difficulty with her
memory. She had deeded all of her land to one son but later asserted that she
186. !d. at
42 A.2d at 748.
187. See also Bryden'� Estate, 211 Pa. 633, 61 A. 250 (1905); Hoffman's Estate, 209 Pa.
357,58 A. 665 (1904).
188. 364 P.2d 896 (Okla. 1961).
189. 180 Neb. 748, 145 N.W.2d 339 (1966).
190. 95 Utah 219, 79 P.2d 649 (1938).
_,
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would prefer him not to have it. She also had a number of other obvious
memory losses. Among other things, she had apparently signed a document
authorizing the appointment of a guardian which she later repudiated. She
could not recall the number of acres in her farm or how many cows she
owned. More central than a concern for the effect of her memory on the
disposition of her property, however, appeared to be the concern of the other
children that the son who had benefited from her previous generosity was
obtaining an undue advantage over them. The guardianship approved in both
the trial and appellate courts presumably took care of their interests.
In O/son v. Olson,'�1 the main dispute appears to have been between the
aard's second wife and his children. The ward was a man of limited education
(less than one year of formal education). Although penniless when he married
his first wife, he apparently amassed a substantial sum during his lifetime. He
lost most, but not all of it, during the depression by loaning large sums to
his friends. About twenty-three thousand dollars was lost in this fashion. After
the death of his tirst wife he remarried in 1939. His life with his second wife
was marked by trouble and in the process the ward's funds were further

depleted. When the second wife died the ward's children arranged for his care
with a nephew, apparently not wanting to care for him themselves. The ward
agreed to pay the nephew five thousand dollars for the care of him for the
rest of his life. This left seven thousand dollars of his funds in the bank. On
the urging of his nephew's wife, that the money be put in a bank, he consented
only to tind that she deposited it in her own name. At this point, plaintiffs
children reappeared. They offered help and took their father to an attorney.
Instead of legal proceedings to recover his seven thousand dollars, however,
the proceedings initiated were those appropriate to having him declared
incompetent. On later review the Supreme Court of Iowa returned him to
competence.
The most common functional defect attributed to alleged incompetence
in the cases is memory loss. Memory loss was central to the decision to allow
guardianship in Lamont's Estate.192 The ward's forgetfulness in Schulmeyer's
Guardianship v. McAllister,193 and most particularly his inability to recall his

recent financial transactions, led to the court's approval of his guardianship.
Similarly in Blochowitz Guardianshipl94 the ward's confusion as to the current
status of various pieces of property featured prominently in her being declared
incompetent. On the other hand, in the Denner case discussed previously and
Michelson's Guardianshipl95 and Nelson's Guardianshipl96 the courts refused
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.

242 Iowa 192,46 N.W.2d 1 (1951).
190.
171 Cal. 340,153 P. 233 (1915).
135 Neb. 163,280 N.W. 438 (1938).
8 Wash. 2d 327, III P.2d 1011 (1941).
12 Wash. 2d 382,121 P.2d 968 (1942).

Supra note
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to consider mere memory impairment a sufficient reason for legitimating
guardianship. The dilemma, in these cases, results from the court's lack of
alternatives. They could either declare incompetency or refuse to declare it.
Neither alternative well matched the needs of the case. The proposal, in this
paper, for the appointment of a legal assistant would appear to provide a more
appropriate remedy in such cases and to relieve the courts of the dilemma.
Finally, a comparison of two cases of alleged incompetents who exhibited
bizarre behavior suggests the importance of viewing cases from a new
perspective. In Waite's Guardianship197 the ward was 78. Her second husband
died when she was 75 leaving her thirty-one thousand dollars. At 76 she
married her third husband, aged 45, living with him only two months. Her
divorce cost her four thousand dollars. She spent another eight thousand
dollars on purchasing a ranch which she had always wanted to own and paid
$850 to stock it with cattle. Having acquired it, she gave half interest in the
ranch and its income to a man in return for his management of it and his
serving her as chauffeur. By the time of the incompetency hearing she had
tired of the ranch and wanted to be rid of it.
In Smith v. Smith198 the alleged incompetent was 77 years old and worth
about one hundred thousand dollars. Much of his accumulated wealth was
apparently due to the hard effort of his wife who died of malnutrition three
years before the proceedings in question. During her life his wife had been
required to live in a small portion of her husband's hotel on a narrow cot
although there were many unoccupied bedrooms in the hotel. Her diet
consisted of sandwiches, crackers and canned goods despite their wealth and
this undoubtedly led to the malnutrition of which the wife died. The husband,
after his wife's demise, often frequented local taverns, made a present of
eighteen thousand dollars in bonds to a married woman (although he later
forgot what had happened to the money). He followed that gift with a gift of
a three thousand dollar car. She in turn cared for the widower. Finally, when
the widower published a public notice of his intention to sell all of his real
property, his only child brought suit to have him declared incompetent.
The courts decided the cases differently. Although guardianship had
resulted in the trial court, the Supreme Court of California in Waite's
Guardianship199 invalidated it, characterizing the ward's conduct as merely

poor business judgment. On the other hand, in Smith v. Smith20 the Supreme
Court of Alabama affirmed the appointment of a guardian. In both courts,
the self-indulgent conduct of the alleged incompetent was the sole focal issue.
In neither did the court address itself to the question of the deprivation of
others by the squandering of funds. Yet, clearly, that is what both cases were
197.
198.
199.
200.

14 Cal. 2d 727,97 P.2d238 (1939).
254 Ala. 404, 48 So. 2d 546 (1950).
Supra note 197.
Supra note 198.
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primarily about. In both the aged had used their funds to gratify their
immediate desires. At the time of hearing, children of both stood to lose
substantial value in their inheritance expectancy. Yet, neither court inquired
into their needs or the legitimacy of their claims on their parents' estate. It
may well be, in the circumstances, that both parents were, quite rationally,
squandering their funds in recognition of the fact that they would not likely
be able to enjoy them much longer. If one examines both cases from the
standpoint of interests adverse to the ward's, there is little reason, on the facts
developed, for distinguishing between the children of the two a lleged
incompetents in question. The interest of the wife it} Smith v. Smith.201
however, had she been alive at the time when proceedings were begun, would
be another matter. Her husband's self-indulgence with his substantial wealth
would be most objectionable when contrasted to her Cinderella-like existence.

One could easily justify an intervention in her husband's financial schemes on

her behalf while, on the basis of the same conduct, one might have greater
doubt about his child and should probably reject a claim based on familial
ties by anyone more distantly related.
It is rather curious that in a legal system which ordinarily is very
cognizant of checks and balances, persons are allowed the weapon of
incompetency in promoting self-interest. Elemental notions of conflicts of
interests suggest that a revision of the underlying theory is long overdue.
Where intervention is required for any reason it seems extremely important
to assure that if a surrogate be appointed he be as free of the pressures of
avarice as the system will allow. It should be clear that his obligation is to
maximize the benefit to the ward and not of the ward's heirs.202 At the same
ti me, the system should be recast so as to reduce the occasions for the
appointment of a surrogate at all.
201. /d.
202. S"" Jones v. Lamoourn. 159 Colo. 246.411 P.2d II (1966).
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